Seberapa cepat pasukan Legion Rom boleh berarak? Bagaimana ia dibandingkan dengan pasukan berkuda mereka?

Seberapa cepat pasukan Legion Rom boleh berarak? Bagaimana ia dibandingkan dengan pasukan berkuda mereka?


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Dalam sejarah Rom terdapat banyak kejadian pasukan berbaris ke atas dan ke bawah Eropah, dari Sepanyol ke Rom dan dari Rom ke Syria. Saya berminat untuk mengetahui seberapa cepat tentera ini dapat bergerak? Adakah masa setengah tahun untuk bergerak dari Pegunungan Alpen ke Rom atau memerlukan seminggu?

Juga bagaimana kelajuan itu dibandingkan dengan kecepatan cadangan kapal berkuda yang digunakan dengan begitu hebat oleh maharaja Rom?


Laman web ini (menyeronokkan) memerlukan 10 batu sehari, sambil menambah penafian yang diperlukan "itu bergantung".

Namun, saya tidak dapat mengesahkan nombor ini dalam sumber yang dipetik: John Pebbie's Mesin Perang Rom nampaknya merujuk pada "10 mil" hanya dalam kaitan dengan perarakan yang dilakukan oleh tentera Caesar pada pendekatan terakhirnya untuk Pertempuran Sabis.

Buku yang sama mengandungi beberapa nombor konkrit (termasuk rujukan kepada sumber utama) untuk kelajuan yang mungkin dicapai oleh perkhidmatan pos Rom dan oleh individu yang melakukan misi penting. Berikut adalah contoh:

Plutarch menceritakan bahawa Julius Caesar pada satu masa melakukan perjalanan sejauh 100 batu sehari selama lapan hari berturut-turut, memandu dengan sewaan raeda.

Ini menceritakan bahawa pasukan berkuda ("dikerahkan secara meluas di layar pelindung di sekitar tentara pada perarakan, dan menembus lebih jauh ke pedesaan sekitarnya") dapat menempuh jarak 40 mil sehari. Ini juga memetik Vegetius (abad ke-5 M) mengenai latihan perarakan latihan dengan baju besi lengkap pada jarak sepuluh batu dari kem dan kembali:

Decem milia passuum armati instruksional omnibus telis pedites militari lulusan i red ac iubebantur di castra…

Dan FYI, inilah akaun kemudian (sekali lagi dari Andrew Wheatcroft's Musuh di Gerbang: Habsburg, Uthmaniyyah, dan Pertempuran untuk Eropah) yang mengukur jarak harian yang dilalui oleh tentera Uthmaniyyah pada abad ke-17:

Seluruh kekuatan hanya dapat bergerak dengan kecepatan gerobak lembu dan meriam, mungkin dua belas batu sehari.


Dari Ringkasan dalam Pemerhatian ketika berarak pasukan Legionari Rom…

  • pasukan tentera Rom mungkin membawa tidak lebih dari 40 kg pakaian, peralatan, makanan, senjata dan baju besi;
  • seorang legiun dalam suatu hari berkempen, berjalan di jalan sejauh 29 km dalam masa kira-kira 7:30 jam dan membina kem perbarisan sementara, mungkin menghabiskan antara 5500 hingga 6000 kilokalori tenaga, dan memerlukan yang sama untuk pengisian semula;
  • legiun memerlukan 9 hingga 11 liter air untuk mengelakkan dehidrasi dan tekanan panas;
  • perarakan di luar jalan memerlukan perbelanjaan lebih sedikit tenaga daripada menggunakan jalan;
  • legiun khas (berat badan 80 kg, berat muatan 40 kg, kecepatan perarakan 1.2741 m / s), boleh berjalan di sepanjang jalan di Britain dengan perbelanjaan tenaga antara 501 hingga 542 watt;
  • Legiunion Rom mempunyai kecepatan perarakan di jalan antara 1.2741 hingga 1.3411 m / s (2.85 hingga 3.0mph atau 4.59kph hingga 4.83kph), dengan nilai yang lebih rendah cenderung menjadi kecepatan yang lebih biasa;
  • pada kecepatan di jalan 1.274 m / s selama 29 km, barisan tentera terakhir yang berukuran lebih dari 3 legiun akan tiba setelah matahari terbenam, oleh itu, tentera Rom yang besar berbaris di beberapa lajur (11 Ogos waktu siang);
  • Legiun Rom dijangka berjalan selama 7 hingga 9:30 jam setiap hari - masa-masa ini tidak luar biasa, tidak terlalu letih tentera, dan akan berkekalan, iaitu norma untuk perarakan dalam atau luar jalan;
  • halaju di luar jalan mungkin berada dalam julat 0.6706 m / s (1.5 mph, 2.41 kph) hingga 0.7639 m / s (1.71 mph, 2.75 kph);
  • di luar jalan, satu tiang berbaris lebih dari 15 km atau lebih, dan untuk kekuatan legiun lebih besar dari 2, bukanlah pilihan biasa dan berterusan dan memerlukan strategi lain;
  • semua tentera yang berukuran lebih dari 2 pasukan mungkin berbaris di luar jalan di beberapa lajur untuk sampai ke destinasi mereka;
  • a) Tentera Rom yang berukuran 1 dan 2 legiun boleh bergerak dalam satu tiang di sepanjang jalan; b) tentera yang lebih besar dari 2, mungkin 3, pasukan berbaris di beberapa tiang, sama ada di dalam atau di luar jalan raya.

Saya tahu ini adalah soalan lama tetapi saya rasa ada alat yang sangat baik yang tidak disebutkan di sini. Terdapat model komprehensif yang diciptakan oleh Stanford untuk memodelkan berapa lama perjalanan pada zaman Rom, kerana anda berminat dengan Ketenteraan pastikan untuk menetapkan pilihan anda dengan betul, di bawah Mod Kaki pastikan memilih Rapid Military March (atau Ox-Cart atau apa sahaja bergantung pada kaedah perjalanan tentera,) juga Pilih Sungai dan bertukar menjadi Ketenteraan. Model ini membolehkan begitu banyak pemboleh ubah termasuk jenis perarakan, musim perarakan, kaedah pengangkutan. Ini akan memberi anda jangka masa perjalanan yang sangat baik dari pelbagai bandar di Empire.

http://orbis.stanford.edu/


Scipio Africanus legiun berbaris rata-rata 26 batu / hari untuk pergi dari Tarraco ke Carthago Nova dalam 6 hari, tetapi jumlahnya sangat ekstrem dengan kelajuan yang sangat dipaksa, biasanya, itu adalah separuh dari jumlah itu.


John Harrel dalam "The Nisibis War" menggunakan anggaran 10 batu sehari - kira-kira 16km sehari - untuk keadaan "normal". Mereka dapat pergi lebih cepat, dengan biaya kelelahan atau kem yang kurang maju, atau mereka dapat berjalan lebih lambat, jika keadaan seperti panas atau medan memaksa mereka.

Salah satu fakta menarik adalah bahawa pasukan yang cukup besar akan mempunyai barisan hadapan dan pengakap mendirikan kem seterusnya sebelum pengawal belakang meninggalkan kem sebelumnya!


Persoalannya ialah seberapa cepat pasukan Legion Rom dapat bergerak? Oleh itu, seorang askar tunggal dalam tentera AS moden diperlukan untuk menyelesaikan March Loaded, dengan berat hingga 70 paun, 12 batu dalam masa kurang dari 3 jam untuk mencapai Badge Infantryman Pakar. 'Raid March' yang dipraktikkan oleh French Foreign Legion memerlukan perarakan sejauh 75 batu dalam 3 hari dengan peralatan tempur penuh yang membawa senapang dan 70 paun gear. Perarakan Full Pace untuk Legionary Rom dalam latihan asas memerlukan perarakan pada waktu siang 22 batu. Jelas sekali bahawa pasukan Romawi boleh berjalan 20-30 batu sehari jika diperlukan. Tentara Romawi yang didokumentasikan dengan baik tidak pernah berhenti berlatih selama 25 tahun berkhidmat dan mungkin merupakan kesalahan untuk meremehkan kecergasan dan ketahanan seorang askar Rom berbanding dengan seorang askar moden terutama memandangkan satu-satunya cara pergerakan pasukan yang tersedia untuk seorang Romawi askar kaki adalah perarakan.


Legion Vs Phalanx: Dua Pembentukan Powerhouse dari Perang Purba

Organisasi dari perang pahlawan gaya Homeric hingga peperangan hoplite yang ketat telah berubah dunia. Pembentukan Hellenic yang kuat ini membolehkan orang Yunani kuno menahan pencerobohan Parsi yang kuat dan menyebarkan budaya Hellenic ke seluruh Mediterranean. Falanx Macedonia membawa konsep perang kumpulan yang padu ke tahap yang lain dengan phalangites bersenjata sarissa dan di bawah Philip dan Alexander, menggerakkan setiap lawan di depan mereka.

Semasa kerajaan Alexander berkembang dan berpecah-belah, orang Rom sibuk dengan tugas berat mereka untuk menakluki Itali. Mula-mula mengadopsi phalanx gaya hoplite kerana pengaruh dari koloni Hellenic Itali Selatan, tentera akhirnya berubah menjadi legiun manipular yang fleksibel. Transformasi ini kemungkinan disebabkan oleh perang Samnite yang dilancarkan di kawasan pergunungan di Itali tengah yang bervariasi di mana orang Rom memerlukan formasi yang lebih mudah disesuaikan.

Legiun manipular Rom dan phalanx Macedonia masing-masing merupakan faktor penting dalam kejayaan negara mereka, tetapi adakah satu formasi sebenarnya lebih baik daripada yang lain?

Huraian terbaik mengenai formasi berasal dari sejarawan Polybius. Dibesarkan di Yunani kuno, Polybius bertempur dalam pertempuran Yunani sebelum dihantar ke Rom sebagai tebusan, walaupun dia diberi kebebasan besar selama tinggal. Di Rom Polybius mempelajari peperangan Rom dan begitu juga berpengalaman dengan perang gaya phalanx dan maniple.

Oleh Roman Legionnaires & # 8211 CC BY-ND 2.0

Dalam sejarahnya, Polybius secara langsung menangani kekuatan dan kelemahan kedua formasi tersebut. Untuk phalanx, formasi mendalam enam belas orang memiliki lima peringkat pertama dengan tombak mereka memanjang dari formasi sementara barisan yang tersisa memegang tombak mereka tegak atau pada sudut untuk menangkis peluru berpandu. Pembentukan ketat dengan rata-rata phalangites yang mengambil bagian depan tiga kaki berarti bahawa, secara teorinya, rata-rata askar, yang memerlukan dua kali frontage untuk beroperasi dengan pedang atau tombak, menghadapi total sepuluh mata tombak.

Sarissa Phalanx

Bukan semata-mata formasi pertahanan, phalanx dapat maju ke depan dengan pikes berputar melalui hampir semua lawan dengan mudah. Polybius menyatakan bahawa kelemahan terbesar phalanx adalah kegunaannya di kawasan yang lasak, tetapi kita tahu bahawa di bawah kepemimpinan yang kompeten, phalanx telah memperoleh kemenangan walaupun ketika menyeberangi sungai.

Pembentukan manipular Rom adalah susun atur yang unik. Dengan tiga garis, satu di belakang yang lain orang Rom dikerahkan dalam manipulasi yang berasingan dengan setiap baris mempunyai jurang ukuran maniple antara unit, dengan jurang yang dilindungi oleh barisan berikutnya kembali membuat formasi papan catur. Kaedah tepat formasi ini yang terlibat dalam pertempuran telah dipersoalkan kerana jurang yang besar, tetapi nampaknya jurang itu tetap sementara digunakan untuk membolehkan garis belakang menyokong ketika diperlukan.

Phalanx Yunani menyerang, ketika peletis melemparkan tombak ke atas kepala hoplite.

Terdapat beberapa perbezaan utama dalam formasi. Manipulasi itu lancar, dengan setiap manipulasi dipimpin oleh centurion yang didorong untuk mengambil inisiatif dan memimpin dengan contoh. Falanx jauh lebih kaku, tetapi sangat kuat dalam serangan frontal. Askar individu phalanx terikat pada kohesi unitnya, tetapi mempunyai keselamatan beberapa ujung tombak antara barisan depan dan musuh.

Individu Rom mempunyai lebih banyak ruang untuk beroperasi, dengan perisai besar dan pedang yang berkesan membolehkan mereka dengan yakin terlibat dan mempertahankan secara individu dan sebagai kumpulan dengan mengunci perisai. Lembing yang dilemparkan oleh maniples juga merupakan alat pemecah formasi yang efektif yang digunakan untuk mengurangkan kesan serangan musuh atau membuat lubang untuk dieksploitasi dengan tuduhan mereka sendiri.

Kedua formasi itu benar-benar bertemu dalam pertempuran beberapa kali dengan hasil yang bervariasi. Pertempuran pertama berlaku semasa pencerobohan Pyrrhus ke Itali pada tahun 280 SM. Tiga pertempuran besar dilancarkan dengan dua yang pertama adalah kemenangan Pyrrhic untuk Pyrrhus. Di Heraclea dan Asculum, phalanx Macedonia yang dicuba dan benar menghadapi manipulasi Rom yang hanya dapat dibuat 40-100 tahun sebelumnya.

The Hoplite Phalanx

Pyrrhus memenangi pertempuran ini tetapi manipulasi tersebut melakukan usaha yang berani dan menyebabkan korban yang besar. Pada pertempuran Beneventum beberapa tahun kemudian Romawi akhirnya menang, dengan bantuan gajah Pyrrhus yang menyerang kembali ke barisannya sendiri. Perincian untuk pertempuran ini jarang berlaku tetapi walaupun nampaknya walaupun phalanx benar-benar bergerak melalui Rom, ia dilakukan dengan susah payah dan di Beneventum fleksibiliti manipulasi membolehkan mereka merebut bukaan yang dibuat oleh gajah yang mengamuk sehingga menyebabkan kekacauan .

Selepas pencerobohan Pyrrhus, orang Rom berperang melawan titanic melawan Carthage yang membawa mereka ke status kuasa besar di Mediterranean. Hampir setelah menyelesaikan perang Punic kedua, orang Rom menyerang Makedon untuk bertempur dengan Philip V, yang pernah menjadi sekutu Carthage dan sekarang mengganggu kota-kota Yunani yang bersekutu dengan Rom. Tentera Rom dan tentera phalanx Philip bertemu di Cynoscephalae, dengan bukit besar yang memisahkan kedua kubu.

Philip memutuskan untuk mengambil inisiatif dan berjalan keluar dengan separuh kanan phalanxnya, sehingga mereka dapat mengambil bukit dan menyerang menuruni bukit. Ketika kiri Rom menemui mereka dan berpegang teguh, orang Rom kanan berjalan ke atas bukit untuk menolak kelebihan tentera Philip yang lain. Sambil maju, seorang perwira yang tidak disebutkan namanya memperhatikan bahawa mereka berjalan tepat melewati belakang phalanx kanan Macedonia dan mengupas kekuatan yang cukup besar untuk mengapit phalanx yang terlibat dan dengan cepat mengarahkan mereka.

Sementara itu, sayap kanan Rom yang tersisa maju ke atas bukit dan bertemu dengan tentera Philips yang lain ketika mereka tiba di tandan. Fleksibiliti manipulasi membolehkan mereka mengelilingi dan memusnahkan setiap unit sehingga pasukan Philip yang lain melarikan diri. Pertempuran ini menunjukkan kepintaran dan kebebasan yang diizinkan oleh pegawai Rom untuk membolehkan mereka membuat keputusan di medan perang yang sangat mempengaruhi hasilnya.

Phalanx bertempur dengan amphora hitam, c. 560 SM.

Contoh hebat pertempuran maniple dan phalanx terakhir terdapat pada pertempuran Pydna semasa perang Macedonia ketiga antara Rom dan Perseus. Pertempuran yang menentukan berlaku di tanah rata tidak terlalu jauh dari lokasi Thermopylae. Orang Makedonia melebihi jumlah orang Rom sekitar 44.000 hingga 29.000 tetapi kedua pasukannya sama dalam pasukan berkuda.

Kedua tentera berbaris, masing-masing membelah pasukan berkuda di sayap dan phalanx Macedonia maju. Infanteri Rom menemui phalanx dan tidak hancur, tetapi terus dipaksa kembali ke tanah yang rosak di belakang mereka. Ketika garis phalanx panjang bergerak maju, mereka mula melanggar formasi ketika beberapa kawasan maju lebih maju daripada yang lain dan tanah yang tidak rata mulai melanggar formasi.

Pada awalnya, dalam kumpulan kecil, orang-orang Rom menjelajahi celah-celah sempit ini dan berjuang untuk melebarkannya. Ketika jurang bertambah, lebih mungkin, segar, lelaki dari garis belakang diberi makan untuk menyusup sepenuhnya puluhan segmen phalanx dan orang Macedonia segera pecah. Pertarungan pasukan berkuda adalah sama tetapi sebaik sahaja pasukan infanteri berlari, pasukan berkuda mengikutinya.

Batu nisan tentera Rom.

Pertempuran terakhir ini menunjukkan taktik unit kecil yang digunakan untuk menangani tetapi juga menunjukkan seberapa baik manipulasi itu sesuai dengan bangsa Rom sebagai rakyat. Orang Rom sangat berani, dan memerlukan keberanian yang cukup tinggi untuk menjadi antara yang pertama melompat ke formasi musuh yang penuh dengan tombak untuk membuka jurang untuk rakan-rakan tentera anda.

Pertempuran itu tentunya memperlihatkan fleksibiliti pasukan manipular terhadap phalanx Macedonia yang kuat tetapi kaku, tetapi mustahil dengan semua pemboleh ubah yang berbeza untuk menemukan pertarungan medan perang yang sempurna dari kedua formasi tersebut. Setiap sebutan pertempuran menampilkan pelbagai kemahiran dan pengalaman bagi para komandan dan pasukan umum.

Falanx Macedonia terus digunakan dari Jerman ke Mesir dan terbukti berkesan. Bahkan phalanx yang dilengkapi dan dilatih secara minimum masih merupakan kekuatan bergerak maju yang harus diperhitungkan.

Kelenturan manipulasi Rom membolehkan mereka bertempur dalam kumpulan ukuran apa pun dari kemajuan legiun ke askar individu, bersedia untuk sebarang kesempatan di medan perang dengan dua lembing, perisai besar, dan gladius yang berkesan.


2 Jawapan 2

Kerajaan Rom Timur bertahan hingga tahun 1453, dan untuk waktu yang lama ia "mengatasi" dengan baik dalam interaksinya dengan negara-negara feodal Barat.

Secara umum, saya tidak fikir ada sejarawan serius yang percaya pada "kemajuan kemajuan" yang monotonik. Empayar Rom pada puncaknya lebih baik pada beberapa perkara dan lebih buruk pada yang lain, dibandingkan dengan penggantinya 1000 tahun kemudian. Khususnya, birokrasi Rom, logistik, dan kejuruteraan awam tidak setara di Eropah Barat hingga 1500 CE atau lebih baru.

Tidak ada alasan untuk menganggap Rom akan "runtuh" ​​jika suku-suku yang mendiami Jerman pada tahun 100 Masihi tiba-tiba digantikan oleh Kerajaan Rom Suci. Orang Romawi hampir tidak akan mengatakan, "Atas nama Musytari, orang-orang ini mempunyai metalurgi yang sedikit lebih baik daripada kita, masyarakat kita sudah berakhir!" Sebaliknya mereka mungkin akan belajar untuk hidup berdampingan, seperti yang mereka lakukan dengan kerajaan jiran lain seperti Parsi.

Agar "keruntuhan" sosial sebenar berlaku, jurang teknologi perlu jauh lebih besar - fikirkan Sepanyol menghadapi Aztec dan Incas. (Walaupun begitu, kemerosotan empayar Amerika asli mempunyai kaitan dengan penyakit Eropah seperti penaklukan tentera - lihat Guns, Germs and Steel oleh Jared Diamond untuk perbincangan yang menarik.)

Itu sukar untuk dijawab. Kerajaan Rom sangat adaptif, dan masih wujud dalam bentuk Gereja Katolik Rom. Ingatlah bahawa Rom adalah kerajaan pertama, kemudian republik, dan setelah itu sebuah kerajaan. Sekiranya pada zaman kekaisaran, mereka mengumpulkan cukai dari wilayah yang memberikan birokrasi dan perlindungan ketenteraan yang diperlukan untuk perdagangan, dan gaya hidup Rom, setelah kejatuhan, Roma menjadi pusat keagamaan di Eropah. Vatikan tetap sekuat kerajaan lama, menentukan dasar dan akhirnya membuat cukai lebih banyak wilayah (seperti Viking), tanpa beban mempertahankan legiun. Dan Paus juga de-facto memerintah Rom hingga zaman napoleon.

Kejatuhan Empayar disebabkan oleh beberapa faktor, tetapi satu faktor penting adalah suku barbar dengan unit menunggang kuda tangkas menggunakan taktik perampasan. Jalan terbuka kerajaan lama "global" usang, legiun kaki tidak sepantas orang barbar. Ketika Maharaja terakhir digantikan oleh orang barbar, gereja menjadi kuasa bebas. Mereka akhirnya menukar semua barbar, yang dengan senang hati membayar cukai tinggi untuk dinobatkan. Orang Rom. Tetapi kuasa yang sebenarnya tetap ada di tangan rumi paus (187 dari 217 paus adalah orang Itali dalam semua sejarah).

Sukar untuk membandingkan Feudalisme dengan zaman Klasik. Bagi "Maharaja Rom Suci", itu hanya gelaran kehormatan! Dari segi ketenteraan yang murni, anda harus membandingkan beberapa pemimpin tertentu, seperti Charlemagne of the Carolingian Empire dengan seorang Kaisar Rom, seperti Augustus atau Constantine. Saya tidak fikir bahawa Rom akan bertahan dengan penunggang kuda berperisai berat dan kemajuan senjata orang-orang Frank. Sebaliknya, Vatikan berada di Rom, bagaimana anda menangani ketiadaannya dalam senario "zon senja" yang bersejarah ini? Seberapa kuat orang Franks tanpa gereja katolik? Adakah hamba akan melayani tuannya? atau kecacatan ke Rom?


Perang Jugurthine

Perang Jugurthine, sejauh perang pada zaman kuno, relatif tidak penting. Sekiranya tidak kerana kemasyhuran yang diterima Gaius Marius setelah perang - dan pelaksanaan reformasi Marian - kemungkinan itu tidak akan disebut sebagai catatan kaki dalam sejarah.

Namun, ini adalah petunjuk yang baik untuk keperibadian Sulla - dan Gaius juga begitu. Anda lihat, perang Jungurthine adalah perang yang dimulakan kerana seorang lelaki bernama Jungurtha. Jungurtha berada dalam kedudukan istimewa sebagai Raja Numidia pada tahun 112 SM. Ini bukan yang diinginkan oleh Rom.

Ketika Raja Numida sebelumnya meninggal dia membelah kerajaan menjadi tiga bahagian. Satu untuk Jugurtha dan satu untuk kedua puteranya (Jugurtha adalah keponakannya yang tidak sah). Jugurtha tidak menyukai ini sehingga dia menyatakan perang, dan menunjukkan dirinya jauh lebih mampu daripada dua yang lain, dia dengan cepat menjadi raja seluruh Numidia. Ini tidak menggembirakan Rom - raja sebelumnya, ayah Micispa, ayahnya adalah sekutu kuat Rom (ayah Micispa dipanggil Masinissa dan meninggal pada tahun 149 SM). Sama ada semacam hubungan sentimental dengan sekutu yang sudah lama mati atau hanya alasan untuk memperluas wilayah mereka, Rom mengisytiharkan perang.

Setelah lima tahun percubaan gagal - banyak kerana Jugurtha memberi rasuah kepada senator Rom ke kiri dan kanan - Rom jatuh sakit, dan menghantar komandan keempat mereka, Gaius Marius. Dan secara tambahan, Sulla. Ia adalah 107 SM pada ketika ini. Komandan sebelumnya, Quintus Metellus, sudah hampir tetapi telah memutuskan perang tidak akan pernah dapat dimenangkan tanpa penangkapan Jugurtha sendiri. Di sinilah pertama kali kita melihat Sulla yang berani dan genius.

Alih-alih melakukan apa yang telah dilakukan oleh kebanyakan orang Rom - dan akan melakukan sebahagian besar perang mereka dan melemparkan sebanyak mungkin lelaki ke masalah ini, Sulla melihat ke lubuk hatinya. Orang Rom tidak perlu menakluk kota atau negara atau yang lain - mereka hanya memerlukan Jugartha, seperti yang ditunjukkan oleh Quintus Metellus. Oleh itu, daripada melakukan perkara itu, Sulla membuat perjanjian.

Sulla meyakinkan bapa mertua Jugurtha, raja Mauritania untuk menculik Jugurtha. Sekarang, ini tidak adil bagi Marius kerana Sulla memberikan keputusan akhir kepadanya, tetapi peranan penting yang dimainkannya tidak begitu penting. Tidak menjadi masalah. Mahu tahu mengapa? Kerana Marius mengambil semua kredit tanpa mengira sumbangannya. Dia adalah pemimpin yang bertanggungjawab dan ini adalah kejadian biasa di kalangan orang Rom.

"Memang benar bahawa orang yang merayakan kemenangan ini adalah Marius, tetapi mereka yang iri padanya mengaitkan kejayaan kejayaan itu kepada Sulla, dan ini secara diam-diam mengganggu Marius." - Plutarch, Kehidupan Sulla.

Kejadian ini menjadikan tempat untuk hubungan masa depan antara Sulla dan Marius.


Tentera Rom: Taktik Pertubuhan dan Pertempuran

Tentera Rom adalah tulang belakang kekuasaan kerajaan, dan orang Rom berjaya menakluki begitu banyak suku, klan, gabungan, dan kerajaan kerana kelebihan ketenteraan mereka. Ia juga merupakan sumber kekuatan ekonomi dan politik kerajaan, memastikan keamanan dalam negeri sehingga perdagangan dapat berkembang. Namun, kedamaian ini sering berlaku bersama dengan penaklukan. Maharaja menggunakan tentera untuk melindungi Rom dan untuk mengawal orang-orang yang ditaklukkannya.

Tentera Rom juga merupakan alat asimilasi budaya. Beberapa askar berjauhan dengan keluarga mereka untuk jangka waktu yang lama, melonggarkan kesetiaan klan mereka dan menggantikannya dengan kesetiaan kepada Rom. Tentera Rom adalah kaedah yang boleh digunakan oleh orang barbar untuk menjadi warganegara, tetapi prosesnya tidak cepat. Hanya apabila seorang askar telah berkhidmat dalam tentera selama 25 tahun dia dapat menjadi warganegara Rom.

Pertubuhan Tentera Rom

Tentera diatur dengan cara yang sangat sederhana:

5000 Legionary (Warganegara Rom yang berada dalam tentera) akan membentuk Legion.

Legion akan dipecah menjadi beberapa abad (80 lelaki) yang dikendalikan oleh Centurion.

Berabad-abad kemudian akan dibahagikan kepada kumpulan yang lebih kecil dengan pekerjaan yang berbeza untuk dilakukan.

Seorang Askar Rom

Tentera Rom mesti kuat secara fizikal. Mereka dijangka berjalan sejauh 20 batu setiap hari, memakai baju besi dan membawa makanan dan khemah mereka.

Askar Rom dilatih untuk berperang dengan baik dan mempertahankan diri. Sekiranya musuh menembak panah ke arah mereka, mereka akan menggunakan perisai mereka untuk mengelilingi badan mereka dan melindungi diri mereka sendiri. Pembentukan ini dikenali sebagai & # 8216 kura-kura & # 8217.

Mereka bertarung dengan pedang pendek, belati untuk menikam dan tombak panjang untuk melempar. Mereka juga membawa perisai untuk perlindungan serta memakai baju besi.

Taktiknya mudah tetapi cukup serba boleh untuk menghadapi musuh yang berlainan di pelbagai medan: Dari hutan Germania hingga ke kawasan berbatu di semenanjung Yunani. Atas sebab-sebab ini dan banyak sebab lain tentera Rom menjadi alasan wujudnya Kerajaan selama beberapa abad.

Artikel ini adalah sebahagian daripada sumber yang lebih besar mengenai budaya, masyarakat, ekonomi, dan peperangan Rom. Klik di sini untuk artikel komprehensif kami mengenai bahasa Rom.


Seberapa cepat pasukan Legion Rom boleh berarak? Bagaimana ia dibandingkan dengan pasukan berkuda mereka? - Sejarah

Tentera Rom adalah tulang belakang Empayar Rom dan salah satu tentera yang paling berjaya dalam sejarah dunia. Ia terlatih, dilengkapi dengan baik, dan teratur. Untuk menjaga kekaisaran yang begitu besar, tentera memanfaatkan jalan Rom yang dibina dengan baik untuk bergerak di sekitar kerajaan dengan cepat.

Siapa tentera?

Tentera di Legionary Rom semuanya warganegara Rom. Mereka mendaftar untuk berjuang selama 20 tahun. Pada akhir 20 tahun mereka secara umumnya dianugerahkan tanah dan / atau sejumlah besar wang. Dengan cara ini tentera terdiri daripada tentera yang terlatih dan berpengalaman. Ia juga meletakkan tanah di tangan tentera yang setia.

Terdapat juga tentera bukan warganegara yang dipanggil pembantu. Mereka bergabung selama 25 tahun dan dianugerahkan kewarganegaraan Rom pada akhir 25 tahun. Kewarganegaraan Rom adalah masalah besar dan mempunyai banyak hak istimewa.

Bagaimana Tentera Rom diatur?

Tentera dibahagikan kepada Legiun sekitar 5400 tentera. Legiun dipimpin oleh Legate yang biasanya Senator atau Gabenor. Legiun terdiri dari sepuluh kumpulan tentera yang dipanggil kohort. Kumpulan kemudian dibahagikan kepada 80 orang yang disebut abad. Para pegawai, atau pemimpin, setiap abad disebut centurion.

Pemerintah mengetahui pentingnya tentera Rom dan memberi mereka perisai dan senjata yang baik. Tentera Rom mempunyai perisai yang diperbuat daripada jalur besi yang kuat. Seterika menjadikan perisai kuat dan jalurnya menjadikannya fleksibel. Mereka juga memiliki topi keledar besi yang melindungi kepala dan leher mereka, tetapi masih membiarkan mereka memiliki penglihatan yang baik untuk bertempur. Semua perisai besi ini berat, jadi mereka harus kuat dan dalam keadaan baik. Dalam beberapa kes, mereka juga membawa perisai tinggi.


Roman Gladius oleh Juan Cabre Aguilo
  • Pegawai, seperti centurions, memakai jambul besar di topi keledar mereka. Ini membolehkan tentera melihat mereka lebih baik dalam pertempuran.
  • Rata-rata legiun membawa berat badan sekurang-kurangnya 90 paun dan sering terpaksa berjalan 20 batu sehari.
  • Paling besar, tentera Rom terdiri daripada 30 pasukan, atau lebih dari 150.000 tentera. Mengira tentera tambahan, ada yang mengira terdapat lebih dari 1 juta askar dalam tentera Rom.
  • Gaius Marius, konsul Rom dan jeneral, sebagian besar dikreditkan dengan mengubah tentera Rom menjadi kumpulan kuat yang menakluki sebahagian besar dunia bertamadun.
  • Orang Rom menggunakan katapel untuk melemparkan batu besar yang dapat merobohkan tembok. Mereka juga menggunakan busur besar yang disebut ballistas untuk menembakkan anak panah yang lebih besar dari ukuran tombak.

Ballista Rom ketapel oleh Tidak Diketahui

Bagaimana tentera legion Rom berperang?

Peralatan legiunari disesuaikan untuk memastikan kecekapan maksimum. Askar pertama melemparkan lembing (pila) untuk melemahkan barisan pertama musuh & # 8217s. Kemudian mereka menghunus pedang mereka (gladii), yang digunakan untuk menikam di klinik. Perisai (kahak) cukup besar untuk seorang askar berjaya melindungi badan dan cahayanya untuk dapat beroperasi dengan bebas. Semasa latihan berterusan, pasukan tentera belajar menggunakan senjata dengan sempurna. Semua aktiviti harus automatik, yang mengubah tentera Rom menjadi mesin.

Di samping itu, untuk menguasai lawan, orang Rom menggunakan banyak mesin perang (balista, kalajengking, ketapel) di medan perang untuk melemparkan batu atau anak panah ke arah lawan. Penggunaan cara tersebut menurunkan semangat musuh dan menaikkan semangat mereka sendiri.

Banyak saintis juga percaya bahawa tekanan yang berkaitan dengan pertarungan hidup dan mati bermaksud bahawa sebahagian besar tentera menghindari gerakan berisiko dan berani. Sebaliknya, mereka mendekati askar musuh dengan berhati-hati. Tidak ada pertempuran untuk keletihan. Sebaliknya, ada jangka pendek pertempuran sengit dan sengit. Pasukan pertama pasukan sering berangkat satu sama lain untuk jarak pendek untuk tumbuh semula, menarik orang yang cedera, dan kemudian bergegas kembali ke pertempuran. Ketika pertempuran berlangsung, tekanan fizikal dan mental yang besar meningkat. Kekuatan dan kemahuan memerlukan sokongan berterusan pada rakan-rakan yang dapat menggantikan mereka dalam pertempuran atau terluka. Akhirnya, apabila berlaku kerosakan secara tiba-tiba di salah satu unit, penyembelihan bermula. Keganasan itu menyebabkan para tentera kehilangan keberanian dan darah dingin mereka yang terakhir, ingin melarikan diri dan menyelamatkan nyawa mereka. Pada masa itu, isu-isu utama adalah semangat, cadangan dan perintah tegas yang dapat menyelamatkan tentera dari kekalahan dramatik.

Vegetius dalam karyanya Epitoma rei militaris 1 serpihan yang dikhaskan untuk melepaskan diri dari medan perang:

Jeneral yang tidak mahir dalam perang menganggap kemenangan tidak lengkap kecuali musuh diluruskan di tanah mereka atau dikelilingi oleh bilangan sehingga tidak ada kemungkinan untuk melarikan diri. Tetapi dalam keadaan seperti itu, di mana tidak ada harapan yang tersisa, ketakutan itu sendiri akan mempersenjatai musuh dan keputusasaan mendorong keberanian. Apabila lelaki mendapati bahawa mereka pasti akan binasa, mereka dengan rela hati memutuskan untuk mati bersama rakan mereka dan dengan tangan di tangan mereka. Pepatah Scipio, bahawa jambatan emas harus dibuat untuk musuh terbang, telah banyak dipuji. Kerana apabila mereka mempunyai ruang bebas untuk melarikan diri, mereka tidak memikirkan apa-apa selain bagaimana menyelamatkan diri dengan penerbangan, dan kekeliruan menjadi umum, sejumlah besar dipotong-potong. Para pengejar tidak akan berada dalam bahaya ketika orang yang dikalahkan telah membuang tangan mereka untuk tergesa-gesa. Dalam kes ini semakin besar jumlah tentera terbang, semakin besar penyembelihannya. Bilangan tidak ada tanda-tanda di mana pasukan yang pernah dilanda kekhawatiran sama-sama ketakutan ketika melihat musuh seperti senjata mereka. Tetapi sebaliknya, lelaki ketika diam, walaupun lemah dan jumlahnya sedikit, menjadi lawan bagi musuh dari renungan ini, bahawa mereka tidak mempunyai sumber kecuali putus asa.


Mengapa tentera Rom lebih hebat daripada phalanx Macedonia

Saya telah memikirkan masalah ini untuk sementara waktu, tetapi saya rasa saya telah sampai pada kesimpulan, sekurang-kurangnya di kepala saya sendiri, dan ingin mengetahui apa pendapat anda tentangnya.

Saya rasa cukup sederhana: Infanteri Rom dapat bertindak sebagai kekuatan sayapnya sendiri, dan oleh itu ia adalah pasukan penentu sendiri, sedangkan infanteri Macedonia memerlukan pasukan kavaleri yang terpisah untuk menjadi lengan yang berpihak dan menentukan. Kita melihat keterangan mengenai hal ini dalam pertempuran Pydna, misalnya, di mana pasukan Romawi tidak dapat menembus phalanx di depan, jadi memutuskan untuk mengetuknya, di MANNER SAMA yang akan dilakukan pasukan berkuda Macedonia terhadap lawan. Fakta bahawa infanteri Macedonia tidak pernah dapat melakukan ini (secara fizikalnya mustahil kerana sarissa dan perisai yang memaksakan terlalu banyak beban pergerakan) saya rasa kelemahan sistematik. Ini adalah kelemahan yang muncul sebagai harga yang mungkin untuk melakukan serangan / pertahanan barisan depan yang terbaik (nampaknya ia lebih rendah daripada sistem lain yang dilaluinya), jadi nilai bersih keseluruhan mesti dinilai dengan mempertimbangkan dua faktor ini.

Saya rasa Alexander dan Pyrrhus telah menunjukkan bahawa menutup sayap dengan baik dapat menolong mengatasi kelemahan phalanx ini dengan baik, dan ini membawa kepada kejayaan besar bagi mereka.

Namun, pada akhirnya, saya rasa pasukan Rom adalah sistem yang unggul kerana sistem yang lebih mudah digunakan. Anda tidak perlu memikirkan arahan pasukan berkuda yang dilaksanakan dengan sempurna untuk melakukan manuver pertempuran yang menentukan. Infantri sendiri boleh melakukan ini untuk anda. Anda tidak perlu selalu memikirkan melindungi 'perut bawah' phalanx dengan kekuatan pengawal. Infanteri tidak mempunyai perut yang lembut.

Semua ini membawa kepada sistem pemotong kuki yang lebih serba boleh, lebih konsisten yang saya rasa berjaya menjadikan orang Rom begitu berjaya. Ketika anda mempunyai komandan berpengalaman seperti Pyrrhus, pasukan itu kalah melawan phalanx. Sekiranya Pyrrhus memiliki lebih banyak keberuntungan, mungkin kita akan memuji kebajikan phalanx makedonia dan bagaimana ia adalah sistem pertempuran utama di tangan seorang jenderal. Tetapi saya fikir bahawa angka menunjukkan kepada kita bahawa ini dengan sendirinya adalah kekurangan phalanx. Dalam pembahagian jeneral, majoriti cenderung biasa-biasa saja, dan di bahagian tengah lengkung loceng di mana legiun Rom membuktikan nilainya sebagai sistem yang paling berkesan.

Nuklear165

Legion lebih mudah disesuaikan dari segi rupa bumi. Walaupun Phalanx, terutama Hetairai, hampir tidak terkalahkan dari depan, mereka dengan cepat jatuh di kawasan yang lebih bengkok. Mereka juga lebih rentan di sisi sayap daripada pasukan, jadi, seperti yang anda nyatakan, orang Macedonia lebih banyak perlu dikhawatirkan dan dalam hal ini orang-orang Rom mempunyai sedikit beban di bahu mereka. Macedonians, with their Hetairai, Hypaspist, and Peltast infantry elements, had a slightly more complicated elements within their army which, in some regards, made them less cohesive than the Roman legionaries who, man-to-man, were more all-purpose and streamlined into a complete infantry soldier, with even front-line Hastatii able to function with the skirmishing ability of the Peltast, the flexibility of the Hypaspists, and the alternative defensive holding power and offensive push of the Hetairai. The last factor that proved decisive at such encounters as Cynoscephelae was that Macedonian armies took longer to form up, given their more diffuse elements.

All of these, as well as sometimes greater initiative at the lower level command levels among the no-nonsense Romans are largely what account for their decisive victories over the Macedonians at Cynoscephelae and Pydna.

Janusdviveidis

Dan Howard

Scaeva

Polybius is the go-to man for this question. Not only did he live during an era where a Roman legion facing a Macedonian phalanx still fell under the category of "current events," he had first hand experience with the Greek way of war as he had served as a cavalry officer in his youth. He had later opportunity to witness the Roman army in action while accompanying Scipio Aemilianus during the Third Punic War.

Janusdviveidis

Aggienation

Legion vs phalanx is the worst descriptor. Equites and velites are both part of the Roman legion. What you're actually comparing is Roman heavy infantry, or even better described, line infantry, so the Hastati, Principes, Triarii. Or maniples. Makes sense since the phalanx was only one part of the Hellenic Army, often not the main effort. But let's explore why Roman line infantry was better.

- Simpler drill. Roman system was based on militia participation. Conscript the army in Rome, have them report back a week later with equipment, march off to war. Typically there was little to no mention of army wide drill conducted, though some very basic type was probably done early on. Compare this to the Hellenic phalangite, who required months of drill by knowledgeable trainers before they could maneuver. Right there, one is way harder to produce then the other, harder to replace, more valuable.

- Flexibility. Probably the most important, most heavily involved in Polybius' opinion. Romans maneuvered in more lines (reserves), gaps in lines, looser formations. They had javelin missile weapons, the bane of any line infantry, and emphasized the sword for close combat. They could be turned easily, they could be maneuvered easily. They could fight equally well on the side of a brush filled mountain side as a flat wheat filled plain. Their opponents in the phalanx could not. Less flexible, rigid formation, necessity for strict rank and file, marching in step, cohesion a must. They could do not navigate rough terrain without losing that cohesion, their order would collapse. While the Romans had no issues with gaps, to the phalanx they were deadly. They generally fought in one line, once committed there was little ability to change their direction.

- Ease of deployment. A Roman general wanting to choose terrain his men can fight in has infinitely more options than his Hellenic opponent. The way ancient warfare worked, opposing armies were often inside of a days march, or closer, from one another for sometimes weeks, if not longer. During this time they maneuvered around the area trying to get to better positions, cut off the other guy's supply lines or deny foraging. Maneuver warfare. By and large a properly put together Hellenic army was roughly equal to a Mid Republican army in terms of logistics and speed. However, there were simply tons more terrain, especially in the hilly areas of Greece and Asia Minor where these battles occurred, that better suited Romans, while hindering the phalanx. Occasionally these battles occurred in terrain favoring the phalanx over maniple of lines, but even then neither were the main effort or else the fight can probably be better described as a skirmish (like the infantry action at Thermopylae).


Romans marching cadence

Man, this is frustrating. How is it you cant decipher that formation is not the same as marching in step?

I can take one hundred people, organize them in five equal ranks, have them all face to the right, order them to walk, and then they will remain organized. All without marching them in step. They all don't need their left feet striking the ground at the same time. They dont need a musical instrument, chant, or cadence because they dont need to be in step.

Disciplined Formation=/=marching in step

Stop trying to fit your own 20th century ideals on people who didnt think like you do unless you can find true evidence supporting it.

That Vegetius line you keep quoting references more about timed marches than anything else, which is why the "military step" line is so confusing. The context is kind of screwy and its not even known where at all he got the info from, because Vegetius was regurgitating info, taking little pieces of info dating to very specific times and curcumstances, and then he would generalize them as if all Romans did them. We know they didn't, because other better sources conflict with Vegetius.

Lucius

Aggienation

In regards to the former as evidence there is primarily Vegetius' "ad gradum militarem", the military step. But if you actually read numerous translations of it (or in original Latin if you can), its not clearly meaning anything because the context changes in a few lines from possibly meaning the Romans practiced to march in step, then the context changes completely to the next paragraph mentioning the military step having to do with pace speeds.

But overall, I'm not married to either idea. If they marched in step, they marched in step. I have nothing against marching in step, God knows I did it enough in my time in the military. My issue isn't just lack of real evidence, but also the necessity of it.

The descriptions of Roman battle lack any evidence of marching in step. In reality, it was the latter, they describe the opposite, they describe loose organization, much improvisation/intiative, and a more independent fighting style that doesn't need great order placed on it, because then it constrains it. The only evidence of a draconian automaton clock military machine is Appian and Vegetius.

The former gets a bit too wrapped up in describing battles too focused on collective fighting (especially compared to other contemporary sources describing military action that describe the opposite). The latter, Vegetius, is known to be full of it, he was a nobody, without any military experience (and those men where the ones who really studied the subject). He wrote a very generalized "This is What We Should be Doing" military manual to influence the emperor and their court. He incorrectly writes about his own time (playing down their abilities), while also overly attributing greatness and ability on them. When it comes to Vegetius, everything he writes needs to be taken with a large grain of salt.

Did the Romans need to march in step during the periods of the Early Kingdom, the Republic, the Principate? No. While they did need order and cohesion there was nothing at all about their system that needed marching in step. Overall, their tactics, as described by the sources through modern historians, not 19th century ones or before), didn't overly change or vary over the course of a millennium. Sure, it evolved, nothing is every stationary. But while cohort of centuries replaced line of maniple as the base tactical unit, with the javelin and sword replacing the earlier spear armed infantry, the overall tactics remained about the same, with obvious differences but with the overall same underlying military principles. The types of battlefields varied from flat plains to the side of steep mountains. The enemy varied in size, ability, fighting styles, and numbers. But the grand tactics and the cultural organizational practices and individual fighting styles remained so similar its hard to really describe different ages.

The overall battle lines didn't need marching in step to preserve integrity, they were already broken up with gaps, (designed to give more freedom of movement), while at other times they might be smaller. But the tactics between those attributed to 3rd-1st century BC armies isn't much different from those of contemporary times (though even then there are obvious anachronistic generalizations, stemming from presentism). All together though, the sources like Polybius, Livy, Caesar, Sallust, they all seem to go along with the idea that the Romans weren't the automatons that many think they were. The line didn't need the intense order coming from marching in step.

What about the subunits, the cohorts, maniples, centures? Did they need the order coming from Marching in Step? Not according to most sources. Polybius specifically mentions the Roman ranks in open intervals (3 feet between each man), with triple distance between ranks (6 feet of space, to give room to throw the pila), he's describing Open Interval. Vegetius mentions less, approx. 6 inches between shield edges as interval within the rank, but still maintaining the 6 foot distance between ranks. What he's describing is likely Close Interval. The current historical concensus, proven very well in recent journals, books, articles, is that the Romans alternated each interval for different tactical situations. Sometimes they might form their centuries in open order when fighting an enemy in hand to hand (per Polybius and Caesar, giving the men more room to fight with swords), while maintaining very close ranks while needing to create a more maneuverable wall of shields against an enemy with heavy missile weapons (archers, slingers, javelineers, mounted or on foot).

During the first Spanish campaign of Caesar's Civil War, Pompey's Spanish veteran legions were dominated in battle by Caesar's legions, one key reason being that the latter army was highly experienced in fighting large pitched battles (and winning quick sieges), while Pompey's men were used to fighting guerrilla war, using unconventional loose tactics, like holding key ground over maintaining strict lines, because that's how they had fought the Spanish guerrillas under Sertorius and other Iberian, Celtiberian tribes revolting. The point of this anecdote from Caesar's Commentaries was that even at the same time period, Romans didn't fight identically. And yet, some of Caesar's legions were detached and send to work for Pompey (and vice versa), and there wasn't an issue of them not having the skill to work with the larger army necessitating a period of re-training (vs integration, which is different).

So what purpose would have marching in step have made? Don't say everything is easier, because under combat conditions, under poor weather and terrain conditions, marching in step is actually harder, almost impossible. KISS is not teaching marching, because its not necessary. Whatever can go wrong, will. And since the Romans didn't need to maintain perfect dress and cover while using their traditional fighting style, they wouldn't have bothered.

More so, had the necessity been there (which it wasn't, but I'll press on), did the Roman legions throughout most of its history even have the time to learn formation drill/marching in step? At a minimum they would have needed many days, a few weeks to learn the basic drill commands of the army, as described (Fall In/Out, Forward March, Backstep March, Advance, Charge/Attack, Pursue (break ranks to harry a routed enemy), Fall Back in Order, Recall, etc. That is primarily attested to well performing armies since the late 3rd century BC. After Marius and Sulla, it became the absolute norm.

But did they ever spend the months needed to become proficient at marching in step over every type of terrain and situation? No, aside from a very few time period in Roman history, legions were too active in campaign or garrison duties, they didn't have the luxury of not patrolling their occupied territory, or starting off a campaign year months late because then they'd miss the opportunity for a full campaign year (which is only 7-9 months out of the year, depending on the climate).

It was not until the Pax Romana period of Augustus, when the Civil Wars ended, with limited border incursions or internal revolts, that there was more free time for garrison legion, who had little combat duties. But what did they do during this free time? We know those full time, permanent legions had free time, what did they do during it?

One, they spent lots of time road building and other large scale construction engineering projects (which they were famous for). Two, some legions are described as very idle, lazy, undisciplined. And some trained too. Individually training, mock battles, conditioning marches, formation drill. That was more than just formation drill, those new recruits that joined, the tiros, were often young men who'd never touched a weapon in their lives, didn't know how to soldier, didn't know how to dig, or do anything the Legions was wanting to use them for, so it took that long to impose discipline on them, to train them in the soldierly skills, only one of which is marching. We are told that new soldiers joined their centuries to mess, but were pulled daily for intense basic training that lasted for 2-4 months before they were rated as actual soldiers. And it was during those hours the tiros were instructed in all the arts, not just formation drill. Not only, it wouldn't be enough to just basic training and the very occasional pass and review in a parade. Close order drill, marching in step, takes hours of daily practice, in a unit that maintains integrity/retention of individuals. Strangers don't march in unison, only a well drilled team does. Those Roman recruits came from all over the legion (they were assigned to open mess sections across the centuries), so they didn't train with their units, but with other tiros. After, any additional training would be done with the mess section (contubernium) of the soldier and his century. What did that consist of?

Interestingly enough, the sources never really emphasize the unit drill part of training besides mentioning large scale mock battles. I can't think of anyone besides Vegetius who emphasizes the formation marching. What they did emphasize was sword drills and sparring/duels, an hour a day for regular soldiers, with triple that for new soldiers. Which suggests that the Roman training was more individual orientated, to train skills and not to perform as a group. If they wanted automatons, they wouldn't train men for many hundreds of hours on proper sword and shield fighting technique. So not only did they not have the need, they didn't have the time or didn't waste their time.

Now let's go into a more abstract part of necessity, which is the need to fulfill tradition. Roman military evolutionary development didn't have them coming from traditional systems that encouraged drill and marching in step. To compare, in the 21st century, the most skilled soldiers in the world are still taught 17th century parade ground drill. But we don't do it because the Romans, we do it because of our Early Modern European ancestors who managed to militarily outclass everyone else in the 18-19th centuries.

But what about the Romans? What was their military tradition consisting of? The Roman military system went from hybrid phalanx, to multiple legions being multiple in lines of differing sorts of infantry maniples organized largely in loose order, with cavalry forces guarding their flanks, with skirmishers leading. Then that changed to a larger cohortal legion structure that saw much larger armies of more standardized units conducting very large pitched battles. The latter is unique because the time the Romans were fighting in their largest and most organized battles, the Romans had not the time or inclination to waste months teaching their centuries to march in step.
The military traditions of the Principate were directly related to the war time practices of the Caesars, G. Julius and Augustus, whose traditions remained (since they commanded the standing army), the Caesars kept it traditional for hundreds of years hence. So it was those traditions that Vegetius is describing when he mentions the ancient Romans, because he lived in the Late Empire. And we know those guys didn't march in step. So Vegetius most likely either misread something, or more likely, he was talking about learning the normal walking pace and the fast one, meaning the army was more focusing on maintaining formation during standard march and a forced march by having better strength, stamina, and mental toughness.

So where the heck did the marching in step come from?

It came from military theorist and generals of the Renaissance and Early Modern period who were just getting reacquainted with Classical history. They didn't know who Vegetius really was, they thought he was an expert, whereas it was just chance that his treatise survived to be reprinted and read all over Europe, whereas the better ones known to exist disappeared. Those fathers of those kingdoms and principalities, city states, (and a few Republics), found the Classical writings to be very appealing to 15-17th century minds, who liked the idea of the Caesars. Those with the ability to read, and the access to a new wave of books (not written about religion for a change) were able to read Vegetius and took what he wrote at face value. Marching in step was how a few key individuals interpreted that line from Vegetius, and it makes sense that it was. Its not a coincidence that the rise in popularity of the clock and watches coincided with the rise in popularity of marching in step and doing everything with synchronicity. They used their own contemporary modern cultural ideals to analyze an ancient text, which is a major historical faux pax. Presentism.

This is the same reason anything written about the Roman military in the 19th century or early 20th century by British or Germans should be taken with some levels of caution, because they wrote full of presentism and ethnocentrism. (For the same reason that anything written in American in the 18th century about Roman politics should be taken with caution too, because they were placing their own concepts on peoples that lived long before, who lived an alien culture)

And its the same reason that to this day we can't just shoehorn modern ideals and concepts of military organization, cohesion, discipline, etc. on a completely alien culture. Its presentism, and its wrong.


THE ROMAN WAR MACHINE VICTORIOUS I

The legions . . . dashed forward in wedge-shaped formation. The auxiliaries charged in the same way, and the cavalry with extended spears broke through what was powerful and in the way. The rest took flight, though escape was difficult . . .

The heavily outnumbered Roman army defeats the Boudican hordes in 61.

Despite the tales of epic defeats, the greatest prospect for many Roman soldiers was the chance to go on campaign, especially if that meant a war of conquest, with all the chances of glory and booty that might bring. It was also the most terrifying. This chapter traces some of Rome’s most remarkable warriors in republican and imperial times: artillery experts, those who committed acts of remarkable bravery in the heat of battle or who lived to tell the tale and dine off their heroic acts for the rest of their lives. These were the men who helped define Rome’s greatest military successes and slay the demons of past defeats. They also showed what superb training, discipline and well-maintained morale could achieve.

As Polybius described it, the Roman order of battle was almost impossible to break through. The Roman soldier could fight in it individually or collectively, with the result that a formation of troops could turn to offer a front in any direction. The individual soldier’s confidence was strengthened by the quality of his weapons. The result was, he said, that in battle the Romans were ‘very hard to beat’.

Josephus was staggered by the Roman war machine in action during the Jewish War, fascinated by the way the Romans never laid down their arms yet always thought and planned before they acted. As a huge admirer of the Romans, like Polybius he painted a very compelling and biased picture of an invincible force. He saw Vespasian, the future emperor, set out on campaign to invade Galilee and described how the legions went to war. The auxiliaries attached to the legions were sent out ahead to scout for ambushes and fight off any enemy attacks. Behind them came the legionaries, with a detail of ten men from every century carrying the unit’s equipment. Road engineers followed to take care of levelling the surface, straightening out bends and clearing trees. Behind them came the officers’ baggage train, guarded by Vespasian’s cavalry and his personal escort. The legion’s cavalry was next, followed by any artillery, the officers and their personal bodyguards, the standards and the legionaries’ personal servants and slaves, who brought their masters’ effects. At the back came the mercenaries who had joined that campaign, and finally a rear-guard to protect the rear of the column. The Roman army had reached this arrangement after centuries of experience that had also involved terrible defeats and lessons.

The great achievements were rarely commemorated at the site of battles or campaigns themselves, although to do so was not unique. Actium, unusually, had a monument at the location of the conflict. Trajan erected a memorial at Adamklissi (Tropaeum Traiani, ‘the Trophy of Trajan’) in Dacia in honour of his victory there in 107–8, while fragments of an inscription found in Jarrow church in Northumberland in Britain evidently once belonged to a huge monument built under Hadrian’s rule to commemorate the ‘dispersal [of the barbarians]’ and the construction of his Wall by ‘the Army of the Province’ of Britain. But more often Roman military successes were honoured with triumphal parades and monuments in Rome, the latter usually in the form of an arch, like those of Augustus, Claudius, Titus, Septimius Severus and Constantine I, or the columns of Trajan and Marcus Aurelius. Another stood at the port of Richborough in Britain, serving as a gateway to the province and commemorating the completion of its conquest in c. 85 under Domitian during the governorship of Agricola. There were many more in provincial cities throughout the Empire. Victories and conquest were a matter of Roman national prestige and the emperor’s standing with the mob was of the highest importance. Few ordinary people were ever likely to travel to the sites of former battles, so there was little point in going to great lengths to build monuments there.

No Roman general ever went to war without thinking about his celebrated forebears. In 202 BC, when Publius Cornelius Scipio was still only thirty-four years old, the fate of Rome hung in the balance. The Second Punic War had been dragging on since 218 BC. Scipio had carried a vast army across from Sicily to North Africa in 204 BC and had been slowly wearing the Carthaginians down ever since. The following year, a major defeat had cost the Carthaginians dear when Scipio attacked two of their camps near Utica. It was said that 40,000 men, taken completely by surprise and unarmed, had been killed and 5,000 captured, as well as six elephants. Scipio celebrated the victory by dedicating the captured arms to Vulcan and then ordering them burned.6 Polybius painted the picture of confusion, shouting, fear and raging fire caused by the assault and judged it to be ‘the most spectacular and daring’ of Scipio’s attacks.

The war, which Scipio had been ordered to bring to an end, was at this stage still far from over. During a storm shortly afterwards, a Carthaginian naval attack came close to wiping out his fleet. Sixty transports were seized by the Carthaginians and towed away. A little while later three Carthaginian triremes attacked a quinquereme carrying Roman envoys. Although the envoys were rescued, a large number of Roman troops on the quinquereme were killed. This renewed Roman determination to finish the Carthaginians off. When talks between Scipio and Hannibal broke down, fighting was inevitable. The stakes could not have been higher. Both Rome and Carthage were fighting for survival.

The battle opened with a Carthaginian charge, heavily reliant on Hannibal’s 80 elephants. This turned out to be a mistake. The animals were badly rattled by the noise of the Carthaginian trumpets, panicked and turned back to run into Hannibal’s Numidian cavalry. Some of the frightened elephants reached Roman lines, causing serious casualties before being forced off the battlefield by Roman javelins. Gaius Laelius, Scipio’s cavalry commander, took advantage of the opportunity to charge the Carthaginian cavalry and drive them into a retreat. Only then did the battle descend into close combat as the rival infantry forces advanced towards each other. Thanks to Roman discipline and organization, their infantry formations held and were backed up by their comrades, despite a vicious assault by Hannibal’s mercenaries. But the Carthaginian troops failed to support the mercenaries, who turned on the Carthaginians themselves. Only then did the Carthaginians start to show their mettle, fighting both mercenaries and Romans simultaneously, but the Romans managed to stand fast. Some of the Carthaginians fled from the battle, prevented by Hannibal from taking refuge with his veterans.

Thus far the battle’s confusion and the Carthaginians’ problems had been largely self-inflicted. The Romans had done well but had not yet managed to take control. Scipio was furthermore prevented from attacking because of the sheer number of corpses and the quantity of debris and abandoned weapons in the way. He had the wounded carried off before ordering his men to reorganize themselves into formation by treading their way over the dead bodies. It was effectively a second battle. Once they were in battle order they were able to advance on the Carthaginian infantry. The fighting proceeded inconclusively at first, since both sides were evenly matched the attrition was only broken when the Roman cavalry returned from chasing away the Numidian horse and attacked Hannibal’s men from the rear. Many were killed as they fought, others as they tried to escape. It was a decisive moment. The Carthaginians lost 20,000, it was said, compared to 1,500 Romans. The exact figures were academic, and were unknown anyway. The point was the difference.

Hannibal had exhibited remarkable skill in how he had distributed his forces so as to counter the Romans’ advantage. He had hoped the elephants would disrupt the Roman formation and cause confusion from the outset, planning that the opening assault by mercenary infantry would exhaust the Romans before the main confrontation with his best and most experienced troops, who would have saved their energy. Until then Hannibal had been undefeated. Polybius believed that a Roman victory only came this time because Scipio’s conduct of the fight was better, yet his own description of the battle clearly described how luck had played a large part. There can be no question that it was a brilliant victory, one for which Scipio deservedly took credit. But whether it was really the result of his generalship, or of happenstance in the chaos of battle, is a moot point.

Regardless, the Battle of Zama ended Carthage’s role as a Mediterranean power and confirmed Rome’s primacy in the region. Not only did it earn Scipio immortality as one of the greatest Roman generals of all time but it also enhanced the reputation of the Roman army, as well as putting to bed the shame of Trasimene and Cannae. Scipio offered the Carthaginians remarkably moderate terms, based largely on the payment of reparations and the restriction on the numbers of their armed forces, though these had to be ratified by the Senate.

Of the ordinary men who fought that day none is known to us by name, and nor are the anonymous feats of any individual. Even the celebrated Republican veteran Spurius Ligustinus did not enlist until two years after the battle. In 201 BC, after settling the peace, Scipio took his men home via Sicily for a triumph in which many must have participated, and carrying epic quantities of booty. How he acquired the name Africanus had been lost to history by Livy’s time. Perhaps it was his men who gave it to him, or his friends, or even the mob – but he was the first Roman general to be named after a nation he had conquered, though none who came after, said Livy, were his equal. No wonder anecdotes about his skills, his views and his achievements were recounted for centuries.

There was an amusing postscript to Zama. Some years later, in 192 BC, Scipio Africanus and Hannibal met in the city of Ephesus, on the Ionian coast of Asia (Turkey). Scipio was there as a member of a diplomatic delegation investigating the Seleucid king Antiochus III, Hannibal as the king’s adviser. Allegedly they discussed generalship Scipio asked Hannibal whom he regarded as the greatest general, privately hoping that Hannibal would name Scipio himself. Instead Hannibal gave first place to Alexander the Great and second to Pyrrhus. Scipio was sure Hannibal would name him third at least, but in fact Hannibal then named himself, citing his extraordinary march into Italy and the campaign that had followed. Scipio burst into laughter and asked Hannibal where he would have placed himself had he not been defeated at Zama. Hannibal said he would have been first, managing simultaneously to continue his self-flattery while implying that Scipio was greater than Alexander. The story is almost certainly fictional, but it added another to the range of tales and anecdotes about Scipio retold in later years.

MARIUS’ OBSERVANT LIGURIAN

A single soldier’s sharp eyes and quickness of wit could make all the difference at a crucial moment in a campaign. In the war against Jugurtha in North Africa (112–106 BC), the general Gaius Marius was engaged in the siege of a stronghold perched on a rocky outcrop that could only be approached from one direction down a narrow path. The track was far too narrow for siege engines to be moved up along it. On all the other sides there were steep precipices. The siege was starting to look impossible to maintain, not least because the stronghold was well stocked with food and even had a water supply from a spring. Marius began to believe he had made a serious mistake and considered giving up. But one of Marius’ soldiers, an anonymous Ligurian, was out looking for water. He was also picking up snails for food, had climbed higher and higher towards the fortress up one of the precipitous slopes until he found himself near the stronghold. He climbed a large oak tree to get a better view and realized that by working his way through the tree and the rocks he had solved the problem of the Roman assault. He climbed back down, noting the exact path and every obstacle along the way, and went to Marius to tell him he had found a way up.

Instead of dismissing advice from an ordinary soldier Marius realized this might be the break he needed. He sent some of his men to confirm what the Ligurian had said. Based on their reports he was convinced and sent five of his nimblest troops, who were also trumpeters, led by four centurions up the incline again with the Ligurian. The men, who had left their helmets and boots behind so they could see where they were going and be as agile as possible, followed the Ligurian up the hillside through the rocks. To make the climb easier they strapped their swords and spears to their backs, and used straps and staffs to help them up. The Ligurian led the way, sometimes carrying the men’s arms, and tying ropes to tree roots or rocks. When the trumpeters reached the rear of the fortress after their long and exhausting climb they found it undefended. No one inside had expected an attack from that direction.

In the meantime Marius was using long-range artillery to hit the fortress, but the defenders were not in the least concerned. They came out of the fortress accompanied by their women and children, who joined in as they taunted the Romans, convinced they were safe. At that moment the trumpeters at the rear of the fortress started up with their instruments. That was the signal to Marius to intensify his assault. The women and children fled at the sound of the trumpets, believing an attack from behind had taken place, and were soon followed by everyone else. The defence collapsed and Marius was able to press on and take the fortress, all thanks to the Ligurian.

Sometimes soldiers were confronted with terrifying prospects simply for the purpose of gratifying the conceits and ambitions of their commanding officers, generals or emperors. When in 55 BC Julius Caesar began the first of his two invasions of Britain, he was the first Roman to attempt to do so. He had 80 ships built to carry two legions over the Channel from Gaul, and another 18 to bring the cavalry, but when his force arrived off the coast of Britain they were faced with cliffs that could not possibly be scaled. The ships had to be sailed 7 miles (11 km) further on so they could land on a beach.

Well aware of what was happening, the Britons positioned cavalry and charioteers along the coast to prevent the Romans getting ashore. It was already difficult enough for the invaders. Caesar’s troop transports had to be beached in deep water, forcing the infantry to jump down into the water laden with their armour and weapons under a hail of missiles from the Britons. As a result the Romans became frightened and hesitant, not least because they had never experienced anything like it.

Caesar had to order his warships to move into position so his men could attack the Britons with artillery, arrows, and stones hurled from slings. ‘This movement proved of great service to our troops,’ he remembered. The Britons temporarily withdrew, but the Roman troops were still reluctant to risk all by jumping into the sea. Famously, at that moment ‘the aquilifer of Legio X, after praying to heaven to bless the legion by his deed, shouted, “leap down, soldiers, unless you want to betray your eagle to the enemy. It shall be told for certain that I did my duty to my nation and my general”.’ Caesar’s heroic aquilifer then jumped down from the beached transport into the foaming water and charged through the waves with his standard. The prospect of shame was too much for the others on the transport. They followed him, and one by one the men on the other transports followed suit.

Caesar went on to enjoy moderate success that year and the next, but the entire project had hung in the balance that day. His political career could have been destroyed by failure on that beach. The ignominy would have been too much to sustain, especially given the febrile politics of Rome at the time. One soldier had managed to turn the moment around in the nick of time.

At least Caesar’s standard-bearer had acted autonomously. Long before, in 386 BC, Marcus Furius Camillus, a military tribune, was also faced with his own troops holding back. He had physically to grab a signifer by the hand and lead him into the fray to get the others to follow, rather than be humiliated.


Tonton videonya: Roman Soldiers - Demonstration of Imperial Power